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A.

I.

INTRODUCTION

A purchaser who acquires a controlling interest in a corporation often pays a premium above the prevailing market price
for the stock. Legal scholars, the judiciary, and, more recently,
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska. B.A. 1969, J.D. 1972, Columbia University.
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Congress have examined the extent to which such premiums are
unfair to the remaining shareholders and to the corporation.
The initial question was whether to place some limitations on the
receipt of a premium pursuant to a transfer of corporate control. The issue then became what those limitations should be.
Neither the courts nor Congress has formulated a set of unifying
principles that will provide the attorney and other corporate
planners with the desired predictability of result. On the other
hand, the development of different treatment for diverse situations may pay heed to equities that a unilateral approach would
ignore.
While the courts are still struggling with the scope of the
controlling shareholders' duties, they are also creating new
methods of dealing with the control premium issue. One such
refinement appears to be special treatment for close corporations. Another is the possibility of looking to the duties of the
control purchaser as well as those of the seller. On the legislative
front, recent developments under the federal securities laws
have paved the way for federal scrutiny of control premiums.
This Article will examine the development of, and justifications for, obligations imposed on the sellers and purchasers of
corporate control. It will begin with an analysis of state corporate
law approaches to the problem and will proceed to describe the
impact of several federal securities law provisions. Finally, it will
propose a framework for solving control premium problems that
tailors its protections to the size of the corporation involved.
II.

CONTROL PREMIUMS AND THE DUTIES OF

CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS UNDER STATE LAW

A.

Theories of Control Premiums-An Overview

Much scholarly energy has been devoted to the sale of corporate control and the appropriate treatment of the resulting
premium, with the common goal of providing the courts with
unifying principles to aid in their analysis of control transfers.'
ISee, e.g., A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
207-52 (rev. ed. 1968); Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of
Shares, 78 HARV. L. REV. 505 (1965); Bayne, Corporate Controlas a Strict Trustee, 53 GEO. L.J.
543 (1965); Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Definition, 53 MINN. L. REV. 485
(1969); Berle, The Price of Power: Sale of Corporate Control, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 628 (1965);
Brudney, Fiduciary Ideology in TransactionsAffecting Corporate Control, 65 MICH. L. REV.
259 (1966); Hill, The Sale of Controlling Shares, 70 HARV L. REV. 986 (1957); Jarvas,
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The various theories that would prohibit the receipt of control
premiums can be divided into three basic approaches. None of
these theories has achieved more than partial and sporadic judicial acceptance. Nevertheless, they have provided the courts with
insight and a basic framework for analyzing control transfer issues. Accordingly, a brief description of the leading theories is a
prerequisite to understanding current state of the law.
In 1932, Professor Berle developed what is now called the
"corporate asset" theory of control.2 The basis of Berle's theory
is that the premium above the per share market price that the
seller realizes in return for a controlling block of stock is a corporate asset because it "arises out of the ability which the holder
3
has to dominate property which in equity belongs to others.
The corollary of this theory is that the entire premium "if it goes
anywhere, must go into the corporate treasury. '4 A major objection to Professor Berle's approach is that the price paid for a
controlling block will necessarily be higher than the previously
prevailing per share price because the control purchaser creates
an increased demand that, combined with a constant supply,
results in an upward pressure on the price. Another reason for
rejecting Professor Berle's per se prohibition of control premiums is that the ability to exercise control as a vehicle for making the enterprise more valuable is a cognizable property right
attaching to a controlling interest rather than representing a
corporate asset. The courts have been persuaded by these and
5
similar objections to a per se attack.
The judicial springboard for further academic discussion of
the control premium was the Second Circuit's landmark decision
in Perlmnan v. Feldmann,6 which recognized the invalidity of at least
a portion of the premium paid for control. In the wake of scholarly analysis of the Perlman decision, Professor Bayne developed
a theory that, like Berle's, would label the entire premium
Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Controlling Shares: A Reply to ProfessorAndrews, 32 U. CHI.
L. REV. 430 (1965); Jennings, Trading in Corporate Control, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1956);
Leech, Transactions in Corporate Control, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 725 (1956); O'Neal, Sale of a
Controlling CorporateInterest: Bases of Possible Seller Liability, 38 U. PITT. L. REV. 9 (1976).
See generally F. O'NEAL, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS § 4.05 (1975).
2 A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 1, at 207-52.
3
Id. 217; see Berle, supra note 1, at 629.
4 A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 1, at 216-17.
5
See, e.g., McDaniel v. Painter, 418 F.2d 545, 547 (10th Cir. 1969); Gerdes v.
Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622, 649 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
6 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955). Perlman is discussed more
fully at text accompanying notes 60-62 infra.
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invalid. 7 Professor Bayne, while acknowledging the corporate
asset approach, analyzes the issue in terms of the trusteeship of
the control owner and a rigid code of corporate morality. He
suggests the existence of a duty owed by the "controleur" of a
corporation to the corporation and its shareholders. This duty
can be described as resulting from a trustee8 or fiduciary 9 relationship. A significant part of the controleur's duty is to choose a
successor to control. Professor Bayne views the control premium
as "an inducement paid to the controleur to breach his fiduciary
duty in the specific area of the selection of his successor"" ' The
premium is treated as a bribe, presumably given to encourage
the controleur to overlook some shortcoming of his successor.
Acceptance of the control premium, when viewed in this light, is
a breach of duty; therefore, the premium must be disgorged.
The third principal approach is more in the nature of a
suggested remedy than a theory for invalidating premiums.1
Professor Andrews proposes a tender offer to all shareholders
on an equal basis whenever a purchase of a controlling interest is
attempted. 1 2 The obvious advantage of such a treatment is that it
avoids the necessity of determining the fair value of the shares in
order to compute that portion of the premium paid for
control.' 3 Compliance with Professor Andrews' proposal as a
preventive measure will preclude an action against the seller of
control, as least insofar as the premium is concerned, although it
might not insulate the buyer14 or the seller' 5 from liability for
subsequent harm.
Notwithstanding the varying scholarly approaches to invalidating a control premium, the courts agree that, absent special circumstances, a shareholder is not precluded from receiving
a premium above the market price for selling a controlling block
See, e.g., Bayne, Corporate Controlas a Strict Trustee, 53 CEo L.J. 543 (1965); Bayne,
A Philosophy of Corporate Control, 112 U. PA L. REv. 22 (1963); Bayne, The Sale-of-Control
Premium: The Definition, 53 MINN. L. REv. 485 (1969); Bayne, The Sale-of-Control
Quandary, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 49 (1965).
8 Bayne, Corporate Control as a Strict Trustee, 53 GEo. L.J. 543, 549-50 (1965).

Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Definition, 53 MINN. L. REV. 485, 496-97
(1969).
"'Id. 490.
"See Berle, supra note 1, at 639.
12 Andrews, supra note 1, at 515.
' The difficulty of computing the premium based on the enterprise value is evident from the decision on remand in Perlman v. Feldmann, 154 F. Supp. 436 (D. Conn.
1957).
14 See text accompanying notes 170-71 infra.
'5 See text accompanying notes 41-53 infra.
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of stock. 16 At least a portion of the premium will be invalidated,
however, when there is a sale of a corporate asset,17 a sale of
corporate office,' a taking of a corporate opportunity, 19 or
other breach of an independent fiduciary duty. Accordingly,
control premium problems are, in one sense, part of the larger
question of the extent of the fiduciary duties flowing from the
controlling shareholders to the minority interests. 2 1,
B. Duties of Controlling ShareholdersOutside
the Sale of Control Context
Whether or not a controlling shareholder, absent independent wrongdoing or other special circumstances, owes a
fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders may really be little
more than a question of semantics. Without wrongdoing by the
selling shareholder or other circumstances alerting the shareholder that special action is necessary, the fiduciary duty, if
found to exist, would unlikely be breached. The existence of
such a duty, however, may be significant because of the standard
by which a fiduciary's actions with regard to the corporation are
judged. The fiduciary has the burden of showing the "inherent
viewfairness" of its transactions with the corporation "from the
21
therein."
interested
those
and
corporation
point of the
The supposed basis of the duties attaching to the controlling
shareholder qua shareholder is the Third Circuit's thirty-year-old
decision in Zahn v. TransanzericaCorp. 2 The essence of the complaint was that the defendant Transamerica, as the controlling
shareholder of Axton-Fisher Tobacco Company, breached its
fiduciary duty to minority shareholders in executing its plan to
16
E.g.,
17

Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 649 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
E.g., Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 176 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 349 U.S. 952

(1955).
18

E.g., Caplan v. Lionel Corp., 20 App. Div. 2d 301, 246 N.Y.S.2d 913, aff'd mem.,
14 N.Y.2d 679, 198 N.E.2d 908, 249 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1964).
19E.g., Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., I Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr.
592 (1969).
20 A control-related problem beyond the scope of this Article may arise in the context of a corporation's repurchases of its own shares, either as a defensive tactic against
a shift in control or as part of a plan of going private. Cf. Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch.
494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964) (corporation's repurchase of its own shares from a suspected
looter upheld in the face of the minority's claim that the existing management was
wasting assets to maintain its control position). See also, Chicago Stadium Corp. v.
Scallen, 530 F.2d 204 (8th Cir. 1976) (corporation enjoined from issuing voting stock to
its president at a deflated price as a preventive measure against a shift in control).
21 Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939).
22162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947).
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liquidate Axton-Fisher.2 3 The defendants, with full knowledge
of the increased value of Axton-Fisher's inventory of tobacco,
proceeded towards a two-step liquidation that took advantage of
the Class A shareholders' ignorance of the increased asset value.
After causing the Axton-Fisher board to redeem the Class A
shares at a price much lower than their liquidation value,24
Transamerica proceeded to liquidate Axton-Fisher.
The Third Circuit reversed the trial court's dismissal of
the complaint relying upon the "unmistakable" "fiduciary duty
of those in control of the corporation. '25 The court found its
principal support in two Supreme Court cases: Southern Pacific
Co. v.Bogert2 6 and Pepperv. Litton. 27 Although ample dicta in these
decisions support this approach, 28 Bogert and Pepper involved independent wrongs that went far beyond the mere breach of a
fiduciary duty of fairness flowing from the majority.
The Bogert controversy was nothing more than a conventional "cheap stock" problem. In the course of a corporate reorganization, Southern Pacific, the defendant and controlling
shareholder, paid twenty-six dollars per share, while the plaintiffs were faced with a "prohibitive assessment" of more than
seventy-one dollars per share. 2 9 The defendant claimed that the
price disparity represented proper compensation for its efforts
and for the risks it had taken in connection with its underwriting
activities. 3' The Court ruled in the plaintiffs' favor, finding that
even under the defendant's theory, the price disparity constituted excessive compensation under the circumstances.
23Transamerica owned virtually all of Axton-Fisher class B common stock that
had full voting rights. The plaintiffs' class A shares, in addition to having cumulative
dividend and conditional voting rights, were callable at $60 per share plus accrued
dividends and were convertible into class B shares on a one-for-one basis. The class A
shares also contained a liquidation preference and were entitled to receive twice as
much as class B out of the common fund. Id. at 38-39.
24 For an analysis of the extent of the plaintiffs' injury and the proper measure of
damages, see Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 135 F. Supp. 176, 186-94 (D. Del. 1955),
modified on other grounds, 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956).
25 162 F.2d at 42.

26 250 U.S. 483 (1919).
27 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
28 For example, in Southern Pacific, the Court stated: "The majority has the right to
control; but when it does so, it occupies a fiduciary relation toward the minority, as
much so as the corporation itself or its officers and directors." 250 U.S. at 487-88. In
Pepper, the Court stated: "A director is a fiduciary. So is a dominant or controlling
stockholder or group of stockholders. Their powers are powers in trust." 308 U.S. at
306 (citations omitted).
29 250 U.S. at 491.

3 Id.
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The Pepper case simply involved self-dealing in the form of
excessive salary compensation paid to the controlling shareholder, as is evident from Justice Douglas' framing of the issue
in his opinion for the Court: "The case presents the question of
the power of the bankruptcy court to disallow either as a secured
or as a general or unsecured claim a judgment obtained by the
dominant and controlling stockholder of the bankrupt corporation on alleged salary claims."'3 1 Both the Bogert and Pepper
claims would have been valid
even if the defendant had not been
32
a controlling shareholder.

The factual setting of the Transamerica litigation is replete
with such independent theories of recovery. The duty of the
controlling shareholder could be viewed as arising from the possession of inside information that, in itself, has been classified by
other courts as a corporate asset held in constructive trust for the
benefit of the entire corporation. 33 This was the basis of a nondisclosure claim under Rule IOb-5 and under common law fraud
34
and deceit in the companion case of Speed v. Transamerica Corp.

Relief could also have been sought on a contract theory predicated upon the terms of the Class A share agreement as set forth
in the articles of incorporation. 35 The argument would be that in

order to read the conversion and redemption clauses together
with any degree of consistency, it is necessary to imply a clause or
condition requiring that Class A shareholders be given an adequate opportunity to avoid redemption by the exercise of their
conversion rights. Any other interpretation would arguably render the conversion rights hollow.
The Zahn decision can also be explained as depending upon
the "puppet-puppeteer relationship exist[ing] between the directors of Axton-Fisher and Transamerica. ''3 6 This marionette rela31308 U.S. at 296.
But cf. 250 U.S. at 487-88 (Justice Brandeis indicates in dictum that such independent conduct is not a prerequisite to the existence of a duty on the part of the
majority shareholder).
33 Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 498, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d
78, 81 (1969); see Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817, 822-24 (2d Cir. 1973) (fiduciary duty
of insider extended to outsider "tippees"), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom.
Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974).
34 99 F. Supp. 808, 812 (D. Del. 1951).
35 Insofar as the articles set forth the rights of the shareholders with respect to each
other and to the corporation, the relationship between the shareholder and the corporate entity can be viewed as contractual. See, e.g., H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 198,
at 465-66 (rev. ed. 1946).
36 162 F.2d at 46.
32
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tionship might be a basis for imposing liability on Transamerica
as a joint tortfeasor.3 7 If it were established that Axton-Fisher's
directors committed a tortious breach of their fiduciary duty by
allowing the challenged transactions, Transamerica might be
held jointly liable because it controlled the actions of Axton-Fisher's directors.
A narrow reading of the Bogert, Pepper, and Zahn cases-and
thus a closely circumscribed notion of the duty owed by a majority shareholder-finds ample support in recent case law. The
Michigan Supreme Court, for example, recently stated, "the
fiduciary capacity which devolves upon a majority stockholder
comes about only when such stockholder is in actual control and
management of the corporation. ' 38 The court's language highlights the key element of mismanagement and the traditional
theories associated with it rather than relying upon ownership of
the control stock alone as the basis of liability.
Although a fair amount of contrary dictum exists, the case
law best supports the position that, without certain special circumstances, there is no general fiduciary duty owed by those
holding a controlling interest in a corporation.3 9 Because controlling shareholders-unlike directors and officers, who are the
traditional corporate fiduciaries-have not assumed the responsibility of conducting corporate affairs, they should not have to
assume the special burden of justifying their corporate dealings
4
that fiduciary duty imposes. 1
C. Duties of the Seller of Control
Numerous cases have held a seller of control, in certain
instances, liable for the harm to the corporation caused by the
41
purchaser. Clearly, however, the liability is far from absolute.
3

1 See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, §§ 69, 72 (4th ed.
197 1). For a discussion of the joint and several liability of control persons under the

federal securities laws, see text accompanying notes 101-06 infra.
38 Fenestra, Inc. v. Gulf Am. Land Corp., 377 Mich. 565, 600, 141 N.W.2d 36, 52

(1966) (emphasis supplied) (citing Veeser v. Robinson Hotel Co., 275 Mich. 133, 266
N.W. 54 (1936)); see Levy v. American Beverage Corp., 265 App. Div. 208, 38 N.Y.S.2d
517 (1942); Blaustein v. Pan Am. Petroleum & Transp. Co., 263 App. Div. 97, 31
N.Y.S.2d 934 (1941). See generally 13 N. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS §§ 5828-5829 (rev. ed. 1970). "Actual control" may exist in the absence
of majority ownership. Although the state law requires "actual control," the federal
securities laws speak in terms of the power to exercise such control. See note 102 infra.
39But see Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr.
592 (1969), discussed at notes 74-80 infra & accompanying text.
40 See text accompanying note 21 supra.
41 See, e.g., Swinney v. Keebler Co., 480 F.2d 573, 577 (4th Cir. 1973); Seagrave
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In Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp.,4 2 the court was
faced with such a claim. 43 After a transfer of a controlling interest, the subsequent purchasers proceeded to loot the corporation. In holding the control seller liable, the district court reasoned that, at a minimum, the duty owed by the transferor of a
controlling block of shares is triggered when "the circumstances
surrounding the proposed transfer are such as to awaken suspicion and put a prudent man on his guard-unless a reasonably
adequate investigation discloses such facts as would convince44 a
reasonableperson that no fraud is intended or likely to result.
This language, though stated as a minimum standard, indicates that the transferor of control is not bound to take any
action unless suspicious circumstances exist. The Third Circuit,
however, has relied, in dictum, on Insuranshares in placing a
broad duty of inquiry on the seller of control, 45 thereby clearly
exceeding the scope of both Insuranshares'holding and language.
The Fourth Circuit, in Swinney v. Keebler Co., 46 has followed the
Insuranshares approach more faithfully. The court compared the
Corp. v. Mount, 212 F.2d 389, 395 (6th Cir. 1954); DeBaun v. First W. Bank & Trust
Co., 46 Cal. App. 3d 686, 696, 120 Cal. Rptr. 354, 359-60 (1975); Allied Chem. & Dye
Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co. of Am., 14 Del. Ch. 1, 12, 120 A. 486, 491 (1923); Gerdes v.
Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622, 649-53 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
4235 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1940).
43
There is little dispute about the main facts. On December 21, 1937, the
management group transferred the control of the corporation to the Boston
group, none of whom had ever had any interest of any kind in it. With the
control, as that term is here used, went plenary power under the by-laws to
sell, exchange or transfer all of the securities in the corporation's portfolio, as
well as access to and physical possession of them. In this case, acquisition of
control was the indispensible [sic] first step of a scheme, planned by Robb,
Morris and Solomont with the connivance of Paine, Webber & Co., brokers,
the purpose of which was to strip the corporation of its valuable assets, leaving
its mere shell to the remaining stockholders. The project was carried out with
thoroughness and dispatch, but its subsequent steps and its disastrous results to
the corporation are not in dispute and need not be detailed here.
Id. at 24.
44Id. at 25 (emphasis supplied). Rather than emphasizing the existence of a special
relationship between the parties, the tenor of the decision lies in its use of the negligence rubric by pointing to constructive notice as creating the defendant's duty to act in
a certain manner and with a certain degree of care.
45Estate of Hooper v. Virgin Islands, 427 F.2d 45 (3d Cir. 1970):
Whoever sells the majority block of stock of a corporation has the duty to it
and the shareholders to fully identify the purchaser in order to discover his
background and the use to which the control stock is to be put in its management. Insuranshares Corp. of Delaware v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp.
22 (E.D. Pa. 1940); The Sale of Controlling Shares, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 986
(1947).
Id. at 47.
46480 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1973).
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seven suspicious factors it found attendant to the sale in

48
Swinney 47 with the six such factors it identified in Insuranshares

and concluded that the circumstances in Swinney were not so
suspicious as to require the defendants to make further inquiry
or to withdraw from the sale.
A California court, in Debaun v. First Western Bank & Trust
Co., 4 9 utilized an approach similar to that of the Fourth Circuit
to hold the seller of a controlling interest liable for the looting
activities of the purchaser. The court found that the seller had
notice of the likelihood of looting by the purchaser because the
seller had in its possession a Dun & Bradstreet report to the
effect that "[the purchaser's] financial record was notable by the
failure of entities controlled by him. ''5 " The sale constituted a
breach of a duty to the minority shareholders only because of
the seller's actual possession of this knowledge.
Thus, the weight of authority supports the existence of a
principle of the free transferability of a controlling block of
shares, with the Insuranshares restriction presenting a rather nar4" These

factors were: (1) no one from Atlantic had any experience in the
candy business, (2) at the time the contract was executed no one from Atlantic
had inspected the "Meadors operation," (3) by the time of the closing, only
Atlantic's accountant had examined Meadors to "any appreciable extent and he
was interested principally in the books and inventory," (4) Meadors had no
market of its own and the "profit as shown could not have been accepted at
face value by an outsider," (5) prior to the closing Atlantic had no negotiations
with Meadors' key employees concerning the continuation of the business, (6)
the sale was consummated with dispatch, and (7) Atlantic had inquired as to
the availability of Meadors' funds for payment of the purchase price. Although
the district court concluded that the first five factors were "not necessarily inconsistent with a legitimate sale of a business the size of Meadors," it held that
when coupled with facts six and seven, they "were more than sufficient to
arouse the suspicion of Keebler." 329 F. Supp. at 220.
Id. at 578.
48 (1) [T]he defendants' probable knowledge that the purchase was to be financed by a pledge of the corporation's assets, (2) the corporation's president's
clear predisposition to allow a sale to be financed by pledging those assets as
security, (3) defendants' awareness of the purchasers' plan to have a large part
of the corporation's assets converted into cash prior to the sale, (4) the inflated
price or premium paid for control, especially given the nature of the business
which was an investment trust with no physical assets but only the ready equivalent of cash in the form of marketable securities, (5) warnings from the
sellers' attorneys as to their potential liabilities for dealing with little-known
purchasers, and (6) the fact that the corporation had been looted five years
before by a different group who had gained control by using the same method
of financing.
Id. at 577.
4 46 Cal. App. 3d 686, 120 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1975).
5o Id. at 697, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
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row exception to this general rule. 5 ' Courts may, on occasion,

state the exception in rather broad terms, 52 but they do not seem
to require special inquiry by the seller in the absence of suspicious circumstances. The duty owed by the seller of control to
minority shareholders is, therefore, generally not an onerous
one. Because the controlling shareholder's fiduciary duty is only

triggered in certain circumstances, the plaintiff should formulate
at least one of his counts in terms of the independent wrongful
act.

53

D.

The Control Premium Cases

The English case of Gaskell v. Chambers54 is the forerunner of
the modern day premium cases. In Gaskell, however, the premium represented direct compensation to the directors for "the
loss of their offices." 5 5 On this ground, the court held that the
plaintiffs had presented a prima facie case and issued an interlocutory order directing the defendants to give up that portion
of the purchase price attributable to the sale of their seats on the
board of directors.
The first American case to directly confront the issue of the
propriety of a control premium was Gerdes v. Reynolds. 56 The
defendants, who were officers and directors of the Reynolds
Investing Company, sold a majority of the company's common
stock at a premium of at least one hundred and sixty percent
above the per share value of the stock. Prior to this transaction,
the controlling shareholders only superficially investigated the
buyer, a small stock brokerage firm. After the transfer of the
shares and the simultaneous transfer of control of the board of
51E.g., McDaniel v. Painter, 418 F.2d 545, 547 (10th Cir. 1969) (applying Kansas
law).52
E.g., Estate of Hooper v. Virgin Islands, 427 F.2d 45, 47 (3d Cir. 1970).
53
See, e.g., Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 535 F.2d 982 (7th Cir. 1976). In that case,
the plaintiff, a minority shareholder, director, president, and treasurer of the James H.
Black Company, was denied, through a several-step corporate reorganization, his contractual right of first refusal for the controlling stock in the company. The plaintiff
framed his state claim in terms of tortious interference with contract. Besides avoiding
the uncertainties of the fiduciary duty concept, this claim allowed recovery of damages
under the contract as well as the diminution in value of his minority interest. Id. at
989-90. For a discussion of the plaintiff's federal claims, see text accompanying notes
122-24 infra.
5453 Eng. Rep. 937 (Ch. 1858); cf. Snugden v. Crossland, 65 Eng. Rep. 620 (Ch.
1856) (sale of trusteeship revoked), discussed in Bayne, CorporateControl as a Strict Trustee,
53 GEO. L.J. 543, 544-46 (1965).
5553 Eng. Rep. at 937.
56 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
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directors, the purchasers diverted the corporate assets to their
own use. A trustee, appointed in a proceeding under the Bankruptcy Act, sought to hold the vendors accountable for the premium received for their stock.
The Gerdes court stated that neither the transfer of control in
conjunction with the sale of stock nor the receipt of a premium
was illegal in itself. Unless otherwise provided by statute, a controlling shareholder who does not assume management of the
corporation does not stand in a fiduciary relation to the other
shareholders, the court held, and therefore the defendants could
not be held liable in their capacity as shareholders.5 7 The defendants were, however, held to have breached their fiduciary duty
as officers and directors. As in Gaskell, the premium, because it
so far exceeded any reasonable economic value of the stock ,58
was found to have represented compensation to the directors
59
and four officers for their resignations.
In 1955, fourteen years after Gerdes, the Second Circuit announced its landmark decision in Perlman v. Feldmann,611 which
involved the sale of a controlling block of Newport Steel stock to
Willport at a premium of more than sixty-six percent above the
market price and seventeen percent above the book value. The
court viewed the premium as reflecting a bonus for Willport's
newly acquired ability to control Newport's steel allocation-an
especially valuable asset during the war-time shortage.6 1 Having
identified the control of the steel allocation as a corporate asset,
the court awarded judgment against the defendants for the portion of the premium that was properly attributable to the corporate asset.62
57 Id. at 650-51.
5
8 Id. at 654-55.
59 Id. at 660. Interestingly, the recovery in Gerdes went beyond repayment of the
ill-gotten premium. The defendants were also held liable for $903,000 that had been
wrongfully appropriated from Reynolds Investment by the purchasers. Gerdes v.
Reynolds, 30 N.Y.S.2d 755, 771-72 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
66 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
61
1d. at 174-75.
62On remand, the district court found the enterprise value of the corporation,
based upon its book value and earnings potential, to be $14.67 per share. This, when
subtracted from the $20 received by Feldmann, resulted in a $5.33 per share premium
(a total of $2,126,280). The complaining shareholders, who held approximately 63% of
the stock, were granted a judgment of $1,339,769 with interest. Perlman v. Feldmann,
154 F. Supp. 436 (D. Conn. 1957). The recovery in Perlman flowed to the minority
shareholders individually; thus, the new purchaser was not benefited. The figures considered by the district court on remand indicate that Feldmann was permitted to retain
his pro rata share of the premium. Id. at 446-47.
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In Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 6 3 the Second Circuit had the
opportunity to reflect upon the scope of its decision in Perlman.
In Yates, the defendant refused to honor a contract in which he
had agreed to sell to the plaintiff, Essex, more than twenty-eight
percent of the outstanding shares of Republic Theaters at a
premium, thereby giving Essex control. One clause in the contract of sale provided that the seller, Yates, who was also president and chairman of Republic's board, would resign his offices.
Yates raised the invalidity of the resignation clause and the premium as a defense to Essex's subsequent action for breach of the
contract.
The three circuit judges who heard the case concurred in
the reversal of the district's court's grant of summary judgment
for the defendant, but wrote separate opinions.64Although Judge
65
Clark did not reach the issue, Judges Lumbard and Friendly,
relying largely on an old New York case,6 6 agreed that directors'
agreements to resign were not invalid if they accompanied a
valid transfer of control. Judge Lumbard stated that Perlman was
in the absence of a showing of harm to the
not applicable
67
corporation.
The litigational setting of the Yates case raises some questions concerning the relevance of the court's decision to the
more traditional control transfer situation. In Yates, the seller of
control-the usual defendant in such actions brought by the
minority-was trying to avoid his contractual obligations. To the
extent that Yates would have been able to prove the contract's
invalidity, he would have been relying upon his own wrongdoing
to exonerate him for his breach. That Yates failed to convince
the court to rescind the contract does not necessarily mean that a
subsequent suit against him by the minority Republic shareholders also would have failed.
63 305 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962).
61d. at 576. See also Caplan v. Lionel Corp., 20 App. Div. 2d 301, 246 N.Y.S.2d
913, aff'd, 14 N.Y.2d, 679, 198 N.E.2d 908, 249 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1964) (election of directors following resignation of previous directors pursuant to sale of three percent of the
corporation's stock at a premium was invalidated).
Today, § 14(f) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) requires full
disclosure of agreements concerning directorships made in connection with a tender
offer. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(f) (1970). See generally Ratner, Section 14(f): A New Approach to
Transfers of CorporateControl, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 65 (1968).
6- 305 F.2d at 582.
66 Barnes v. Brown, 80 N.Y. 527 (1880).

67 305 F.2d at 576.
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A second case viewed as rejecting Perlman is Honigman v.
Green Giant Co.6" The Eighth Circuit refused to disturb an internal recapitalization under which the defendants, as owners of all
the voting stock, received a premium as compared to the exchange rate for the complaining nonvoting shareholders. 69 Notwithstanding approval of the plan by over ninety percent of the
nonvoting shares, the plaintiff attacked the unfairness of the
reorganization on the grounds that the defendants' compensation for relinquishing their voting control constituted payment
for a corporate asset. The court first held that the plaintiff
failed to demonstrate Minnesota's adoption of the Berle
approach; 71 second, it relied upon
the subsequent ratification by
72
the holders of nonvoting stock.
The Honigman case is inapposite for two reasons. Not only
were the plaintiffs members of the class of shareholders that
ratified the exchange, but they were also in the class that acquired control. Professor Berle, while acknowledging the Eighth
Circuit's disapproval of his corporate asset theory, observed:
The Green Giant decision held only that under the law
of Minnesota, through due corporate procedure for recapitalization, stockholders may vote to compensate the
holders of voting control for giving it up. It does not,
and does not purport to settle the question whether
the holders of control can sell their control without liability to account to the corporation or their fellow
7 3
stockholders.
While the Green Giant case, like the Yates decision, is distinguishable from Perlman on both its facts and reasoning, it cannot be
ignored, at least as a refusal to expand the Perlman doctrine.
The next major step in the doctrinal development of the
68 309 F.2d 667 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 941 (1963).
69 Prior to the recapitalization Green Giant had two classes of stock. The defen-

dants owned all 44 shares of the class A voting stock, while the plaintiff class represented holders of the class B nonvoting stock. Under the terms of the recapitalization,
the class A stockholders received the new common stock on a 1,000-for-one basis, while
the class B holders participated on a one-for-one basis. The result was to dilute the
defendants' voting control from 100% to 9.3%. Id. at 668-69.
7' "The plaintiff relies heavily on the much discussed view of Professor A.A. Berle
that control is a corporate asset. It is claimed therefore that the dilution of the B
shareholders' equity cannot be justified by the A shareholders' surrender of their exclusive control." Id. at 670.
71 Id.
72

Id. at 671.
73 Berle, supra note 1, at 637 (emphasis in original).
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Perlman rationale was the California Supreme Court's decision in
Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co.7 4 The individual defendants combined owned eighty-five percent of the stock in United Savings
and Loan Association of California, which was closely held and
and rarely marketed beyond the original shareholders. The defendants, who wanted to take advantage of the bullish market
for savings and loan stock, decided to undertake a public offering. Because the existing shares had a book value of $1,131 each,
however, they felt it was necessary to split them into interests
that would be more marketable. To effectuate this plan, the
individual defendants formed United Financial as a holding
company for their shares in the Savings and Loan Association
and then made a public offering of United Financial. 7- The
minority shareholders filed suit claiming that the formation of
the holding company and the subsequent public offerings constituted a breach of the majority's fiduciary duty to the minority
shareholders because the minority shareholders could not share
in the benefits'resulting from the creation of a public market.
Chief Justice Traynor, writing for the court, used broad language in holding that the plaintiff had stated a valid cause of
action: "[T]he comprehensive rule of good faith and inherentfairness
to the minority in any transaction where control of the corporation is material properly governs controlling shareholders in this
state. ' 76 Accordingly, the court held that the plaintiff minority
shareholders of the Savings and Loan Association were entitled
to damages on the basis of what they would have gained had
they been invited to participate on an equal basis in the formation and subsequent public offering of United Financial.
71 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969).
75In forming the holding company, the defendants transferred their Association
shares to United Financial at the rate of 250 United Financial shares for each Association share. The first public offering involved 60,000 units, each being a package of two
United Financial shares and one $100 convertible debenture. Of the $7.2 million to be
received, S6.2 million was to be distributed to the individual defendants as a return of
capital. Within eight months there was a second public offering that consisted of 50,000
shares in addition to a secondary offering of 600,000 shares by the individual defendants. The court found that "[t]he derived blocks of United Financial shares commanded an aggregate price of $3,700 per block exclusive of the $927.50 return of
capital." Id. at 104, 460 P.2d at 468, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 596. At the same time, the defendants caused United Financial to offer to purchase up to 350 of the plaintiffs' Association shares at $1,100. Subsequently, the plaintiffs were offered 51 United Financial
shares, valued at $2,400, for each Association share, at a time when the value of the
derived blocks had risen to $8,800. Id. at 103-05, 460 P.2d at 467-69, 81 Cal. Rptr. at
595-97.
76
1d. at 112, 460 P.2d at 474, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 602 (emphasis supplied) (footnote
omitted).
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The Ahmanson decision was heralded as breaking new
ground in even its most narrow reading by "chang[ing] the gen77
erally accepted theory of stockholders' fiduciary responsibility.
A careful reading of the case, however, casts some doubt on this
expansive view. Despite Chief Justice Traynor's use of broad
statements concerning the majority's fiduciary duties to the
minority,7 8 the case can be viewed as merely involving the taking
of a corporate opportunity. Although no identifiable corporate
asset similar to the control of steel in Perlman, was involved and
there was no subsequent looting as in the Gerdes and Insuranshares cases, the defendant majority stockholders did appropriate
a corporate asset, though a more amorphous one. The Association, by virtue of the defendant's acts, lost its ability to go public
and take advantage of the bull market. Certainly, any viable
closely held concern has the potential for going public, and the
success of the defendants' activities proved that the Association
had the ability as well. It may be argued that the plaintiffs could
have pooled their fifteen percent and formed their own holding
company to take advantage of the market, but this position is not
realistic in light of what was left of the plaintiffs' interest after
the defendants' activities. 7 9 In essence the minority was frozen
out by a de facto recapitalization." Notwithstanding this narrow,
more traditional analysis, Justice Traynor's broader language
may have future ramifications.
Relatively few decisions have considered the treatment of
control premiums since Ahmanson. Unfortunately, these cases do
not provide the heretofore missing sense of consistency, and the
field remains wide open.
In Thompson v. Hambrick,8 1 the Texas Court of Civil Appeals
confronted the premium question. The defendants sold their
controlling interest in the American Bank and Trust Company
of Irving, Texas at a thirty-seven and one-half percent premium
83 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1906 (1970).
See 1 Cal. 3d at 108-12, 460 P.2d at 471-74, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 599-602.
79 A fractional interest in a holding company that is in only a minority position with
respect to its sole asset is not likely to be very marketable.
81For the more traditional application of the de facto doctrine in the context of
corporate fusions, see Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427, 143 A.2d 25 (1958), in
which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania pierced a purported sale of assets, finding
that, in substance, there had been a merger entitling the plaintiffs to exercise their
appraisal rights. See generally, e.g., W. GARY, CASES & MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS
1641-74 (4th unabr. ed. 1969) & cases cited therein.
81508 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
77
7
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above the per share value. 8 2 Although the complaint also sought
enforcement of the plaintiffs' alleged right of first refusal, 83 the
key question for the court was the extent to which the Texas
courts would accept the general thrust of the Perlman and
Ahmanson decisions. In asserting that the premium had been the
fruit of the control sellers' breach of fiduciary duty, the plaintiffs drew that court's attention to a Texas decision, which it
readily distiguished, as well as to Perlman and Ahmanson. 8 4 The
Texas court found Perlman inapplicable on the familiar ground
that it "involved more than the acquisition of mere control; it
also involved the frustration of a corporate business opportunity to the detriment of the minority stockholders."8' 5 The court
then noted that, even though Ahmanson "does appear to expand"
the judicial treatment of control premiums, 86 the promotion of
the marketing scheme in Ahmanson was more than a mere sale of
control in the Perlman sense and concluded that the case at
hand did not call for an exception to the general rule that controlling shareholders "are at liberty to sell their shares at any
'87
time and for any acceptable price.
In 1975, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
utilized the Ahmanson "equal opportunity" approach in Donahue
v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 88 in which the corporate defendant
purchased a portion of the holdings in a close corporation of the
controlling shareholders without offering to purchase the
minority's holdings. The court reasoned that, because of the
closeness of the corporation, it would be a breach of fiduciary
duty not to offer to purchase the minority's shares on an equal
basis and at the same price. 8 9
The Massachusetts decision in Donahue thus adds a new
82 Buchanan and Hambrick sold their controlling interest at $55 per share after
Buchanan had acquired some of the plaintiffs' shares at $40. Id. at 951.
83 Each shareholder had entered into an agreement with Hambrick and Buchanan
as "trustees" that provided for the right of first refusal. The court reversed the lower
court's grant of summary judgment to the plaintiffs' claim that this agreement was applicable to the facts at hand. Id. at 952.
84 Id. The court distinguished Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 368 S.W.2d 567
(Tex. 1963), because there the defendants' breach of duty in selling their shares had
been predicated upon their being officers and directors. 508 S.W.2d at 953.
85 508 S.W.2d at 952.
86 Id. at 953.
87

Id. at 954 (citing Seagrave v. Mount, 212 F.2d 389, 395 (6th Cir. 1954)).

"_

Mass. -,

328 N.E.2d 505 (1975). See generally 61 CORNELL L. REv.

986 (1976); 89 HARV. L. REv. 423 (1975); 21 VILt. L. REv. 309 (1975).
"9
Mass. .,
328 N.E.2d at 518-19.
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wrinkle. Rather than pointing to the sale of a corporate asset or
any other independent breach of fiduciary duty, the court
analogized the relationship among owners of a close corporation
to the relationship among participants in partnerships. 9 " The
court thus contrasted the "strict" partnership standard of "utmost good faith and loyalty" that it applied to the close corporation, with the "less stringent standard of fiduciary duty" that
applies to larger corporate structures. 91
The impact of the Donahue decision has not yet been determined. Although the court viewed the corporation's repurchase
of the shares of a former controlling shareholder as prohibited
self-dealing in corporate assets, 9 2 the broad language of the decision could be the basis for the adoption of a per se approach to
the receipt of a control premium in the close corporation. The
concurring opinion, perhaps aware of this as well as other possible extensions of the decision beyond its specific facts, cautioned
93
that "[t]he analogy to partnerships *may not be a complete one.
On the other hand, at least one subsequent case outside the
control transfer context seems to94have extended rather than restricted the partnership analogy.
The state of the law with respect to receipt of premiums by
sellers of control remains confused. The most common theory is
that, unless special circumstances exist, the majority shareholder
owes no fiduciary duty to the other shareholders and may therefore keep the premium. Special circumstances may include situations in which the seller is also an officer or director, in which
the seller has actual knowledge of information indicating that
the purchaser would harm the corporation or the minority
shareholders once it assumes control, or in which acceptance of a
9

"Id. at
.,328 N.E.2d at 515.
91Id. at __, 328 N.E.2d at 515. The approach taken by the court in Donahue is a
logical extension of the landmark decision in Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164
N.E. 545 (1928), in which Chief Judge Cardozo explained: "Joint adventures, like
copartners, owe to one another.., the duty of the finest loyalty.... [They are] held to
something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the
punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior." Id. at 463-64,
164 N.E.
at 546.
92
Id. at
, 328 N.E.2d at 518-19.
93Id. at
, 328 N.E.2d at 521 (Wilkins, J. concurring).
9'In Cain v. Cain, 75 Mass. App Adv. Sh. 1121, 334 N.E.2d 650 (1975), the court
used Donahue's partnership analogy as the basis for enjoining the defendant from competing with a close corporation while he remained an officer, director, or shareholder.
The Cain holding is a significant departure from precedent to the extent that it would
impose a duty not to compete upon the controlling shareholder qua shareholder.
Clearly, if this is the beginning of a trend, premiums for a controlling interest in a close
corporation may well become per se invalid.
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premium constitutes appropriation of a corporate asset or sale of
a corporate office. What other situations may be included is, as
yet, unclear. Ahmanson, the most significant exception to the special circumstances theory, states that the majority shareholder
always stands in a fiduciary relationship to the other shareholders and therefore its corporate dealings must be subjected to
an "inherent fairness" test. Donahue imposes an even stricter test,
but limits its application to the close corporation context.
Under the special circumstances theory, control premiums
will always be valid if special circumstances do not exist and will
probably always be invalid if they do. The Ahmanson test provides the least amount of predictability because it is often more
difficult to determine the fairness of an arrangement than to
determine whether one of a number of readily identifiable
special circumstances exists. The Donahue approach also avoids
the Ahmanson uncertainty because it imposes a per se prohibition in the contexts in which it is applied.
There are no concrete formulations of the parameters of
the control premium proscriptions. The result of these diverse
approaches is a lack of predictability on a case-by-case basis. The
obvious advantage of such an approach is to allow the courts to
achieve an equitable result in each case. Another advantage is
that the corporate planner will have to scrutinize each transaction on its merits with an eye toward giving the minority a fair
deal. Whether the trade-offs are worth the lack of predictability
is a debatable issue, but the more recent decisions under both
state and federal law have not succeeded in drawing clearer
guidelines. Before suggesting which approach or which combination of these approaches is the best solution to the control
premium issue, this Article will examine the approaches taken by
several securities law provisions.
III.

TRANSACTIONS OF CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS
UNDER FEDERAL LAW

The federal legislative scheme 95 takes three basic approaches to the regulation of the activities of controlling
" See generally, e.g., Schwartz, The Sale of Control and the 1934 Act: New Directionsfor
Federal Corporate Law, 15 N.Y.L.F. 674 (1969), wherein Professor Schwartz analyzed
many of the problems discussed here at the time when it first appeared that appropriate weapons could be found in the federal arsenal. Although the earlier cases
opened the paths for the "new directions," developments since 1969 have created several detours.
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shareholders, through disclosure requirements, provisions rendering a controlling person jointly liable for the corporation's
securities violations, 96 and various substantive provisions that
regulate such shareholder transactions.
A.

The Reporting Requirements and the Joint
Liability of ControllingPersons

When a corporation's securities are subject to the registration
requirements of the Exchange Act 9 7 its management and controlling shareholders become subject to various reporting requirements and must file reports with the Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC). In addition to the various provisions that
apply directly to the controlling shareholders themselves, the
98
corporation must file reports that identify its control persons.
Section 13(d)(1) of the Exchange Act requires the filing of a
report by any person who acquires beneficial ownership of more
than five percent of the outstanding shares of a class of equity
securities subject to the Act's registration requirements.9 9 This
section is aimed at alerting the public as well as the corporation
to creeping acquisitions by way of open-market purchases. Section 16(a) of the Act requires reports of all transactions in the
corporation's registered equity securities by officers, directors,
and owners of more than a ten percent beneficial interest. The
section was adopted as a means of keeping track of insider trading, especially trading that may violate section 16(b)'s prohibition
1 °
on the taking of short swing profits by corporate insiders.?
In addition to the reporting requirements, the conduct of
96 15 U.S.C. § 77o, 78t(a) (1970).
97
Id. § 781(g) (1970).
9 E.g., Form S-1, Item 19, 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 8210 (registration statement for securities under the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act); identification of
"principal holders of securities"); Form 8-K, Item 1, 3 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 31,003
(current report under the Exchange Act; identification of "changes in control of registrant"); Form 10-K, Item 4, 3 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 31,103, Item 11, 3 FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH)
31,104 (annual report under the Exchange Act; identification of "parents
and subsidiaries," and of "principal security holders and security holdings of management"). For a more complete listing of corporate reporting requirements relating to controlling shareholders, see 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 8210, at 7141.
91 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1970). Schedule 13D, 17 C.F.R. 240.13d-101 (1976), requires, inter alia, disclosure of the purchaser's identity and intentions with respect to the
shares purchased. Section 14(d), a companion provision, requires that any person who
is making or is about to make a tender offer that would result in acquisition of more
than five percent file all related communications with the Commission. 15 U.S.C. §
78n(d) (1970).
1 1 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a), (b) (1970). See generally Hazen, The New Pragnatism Under
Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 54 N.C. L. REv. 1 (1975).
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controlling shareholders may be influenced significantly by the
joint liability provisions of the securities laws. Section 15 of the
Securities Act and section 20(a) of the Exchange Act provide in
essence that unless the controlling person can demonstrate the
absence of actual or constructive knowledge of the prohibited
activity, anyone who directly or indirectly "controls" a violator of
the securities laws is jointly and severally liable."" 1 The concept
of control, which is not limited to share ownership, is the possession of the power to direct management and policies.11 2 Accordingly, the federal statutory scheme, like the common law, does
not view a majority ownership interest as a prerequisite to the
1 3
finding of a control relationship. 1
The joint liability provisions are far-reaching and do not
stop at imposing liability on shareholders exercising the type of
control present in Zahn.11 4 There is a dispute, however, whether
the federal provisions preempt or supplement preexisting common law doctrines. For example, the Sixth Circuit recently held
that traditional agency principles including the doctrine of respondeat superior may be used to hold an employer liable under
the Securities Act and Exchange Act even if the exculpatory lan'"' Section 15 provides in full:
Every other person who, by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise,
or who, pursuant to or in connection with an agreement or understanding with
one or more other persons by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, controls any person liable under sections 77k or 771 of this title, shall also
be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled
person to any person to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the
existence of the facts by reason of which the liability of the controlled person is
alleged to exist.
15 U.S.C. § 77o (1970). Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act is substantially similar except
for exculpatory language that provides for no liability when such "controlling person
acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting
the violation or cause of action." Id. § 7 8t(a) (1970).
1112The SEC has adopted the following definition in Rules 405(f) and 12b-2(f):
(f) Control. The term "control" (including the terms "controlling", "controlled
by" and "under common control with") means the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and
policies of a person, whether through the ownership of voting securities, by
contract, or otherwise.
17 C.F.R. §§ 230.405(f), 240.12b-2(f) (1976) (substantially identical). Compare the circular definition contained in § 2(a)(9) of the Investment Company Act. 15 U.S.C. § 80a2(a)(9) (1970).
1"s E.g., Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 694 (5th
Cir. 1971); Klapmeier v. Telecheck Int'l, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 1360, 1361 (D. Minn.
1970), rev'd on other grounds, 482 F.2d 247 (8th Cir. 1973); see note 38 supra.
"'4 Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947), discussed at text accompanying notes 22-37 supra.
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guage of section 15 is satisfied. 105 The court there reached this
1 6
result in the face of Ninth Circuit authority to the contrary. 1
Regardless of the eventual resolution of this conflict between the
circuits, these provisions place added responsibility on controlling persons.
B.

The Questionable Role of Rule 1 Ob-5

The Exchange Act's general antifraud provision 1 7 and correlative rule 10b-5,1 8 unlike the reporting requirements discussed above, are applicable to all "securities" regardless of
registration. These provisions have been judicially molded to
cover several types of wrongdoing by corporations and their officers, directors, and agents.' 9 The expansion of the rule
beyond the traditional fraud situation and its extension to corporate mismanagement cases have opened the door to lOb-5's applicability to the sale-of-control situation. In 1952, the Second
Circuit constructed the first roadblock in 10b-5's expansive path
when it announced its restrictions on standing to sue in Birnbaum
v. Newport Steel Corp."" Birnbaum was the lOb-5 counterpart to
Perlman v. Feldmann,"' arising out of the same facts and challenging the same control premium. The court dismissed the
lOb-5 claim because the plaintiff was neither a purchaser nor a
seller of the securities in question. Although the Birnbaum
standing restrictions appeared to have eroded substantially,"1 2 its
15 Holloway v. Howerdd, 536 F.2d 690, 694-96 (6th Cir. 1976); accord, SEC v.
Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 812-13 (2d Cir. 1975); Fey v. Walston &
Co., 493 F2d 1036, 1051-52 (7th Cir. 1974); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d
1124, 1130 (4th Cir. 1970); Armstrong, Jones & Co. v. SEC, 421 F.2d 359, 362 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970).
106 536 F.2d at 695 (citing Kamen & Co. v. Aschkar & Co., 382 F.2d 689, 697 (9th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied per stipulation, 393 U.S. 801 (1968)).
107 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
10817 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976).
1,9 The historical origins and development of lOb-5 have been described fully elsewhere and need not be repeated. See generally, e.g., 1 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW:
FRAuD--SEC RULE lOb-5 (1975); 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1445-518 (2d ed.
1961).
110 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
111 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955), discussed at text accompanying notes 60-62 supra.
112 E.g., Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973),
cert denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974). See generally, Boone & McGowan, Standing to Sue Under
SEC Rule lOb-5, 49 TEx. L. REV. 617 (1971); Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum
Doctrine: A New Erafor Rule lOb-5, 54 VA. L. REV. 268 (1968); Note, Rule lOb-5: The
Rejection of the Birnbaum Doctrine By Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. and the
Need for a New Limitation on Damages, 1974 DUKE L.J. 610 (1974).
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holding was recently adopted by the Supreme Court in Blue Chip
13
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores."
Thus, lOb-5 has not become as powerful a weapon for protecting minority rights in control transactions as was once
predicted."14 The rule can nevertheless play an important role.
Should the minority or corporation itself be cast in the position
of selling its securities, a lOb-5 action would clearly lie. More
importantly, while the Birnbaum-Blue Chip restriction is limited to
private suits, lOb-5 not only involves potential criminal penalties
but also is subject to enforcement by the Commission." 5 Accordingly, to the extent that the substantive scope of the rule applies
to the sale of a controlling interest for an excessive premium,
lOb-5 could be utilized as the basis of an SEC action seeking
injunctive relief or an accounting of profits to the corporation.
Additionally, there remains the alternative of an enforcement
action brought by the SEC and the concomitant availability of
ancillary relief under lOb-5 as a means of requiring disgorge6
ment of the control premium."
Christophidesv. Porco" 7 presented the issue of the substantive
applicability of lOb-5 in a sale of control situation. Plaintiffs,
minority shareholders in Brown Company, challenged the sale
of a controlling block of twenty-three percent of the Brown stock
by Fasco to Gulf & Western at a premium. The complaint also
pointed to Gulf & Western's plan to acquire Brown's assets in
return for Gulf & Western debentures after gaining control of
Brown. The plaintiffs claimed that this was more than the conventional freeze-out situation because of the additional factor of
the premium paid by Fasco. The court, relying upon common
law authority, concluded that control premiums were not per se
invalid under lOb-5 because "[i]t is only where fraud, deceit or
manipulation enter that a violation of state law or Rule lOb-5
occurs." 1 8 The court went on to say that even if the Brown
directors "had violated their fiduciary management duties by approving the plan of acquisition" no federal claim would lie absent deception." 9 The court did indicate, however, that the
113421 U.S. 723 (1975).
114 Schwartz, supra note 95, at 700.
11

5See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1307-08 (2d Cir. 1971).
generally, e.g., Farrand, Ancillary Remedies in SEC Civil Enforcement Suits, 89
HARV. L. REv. 1779 (1976).
117 289 F. Supp. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
11
Id. at 405.
1'See

19 Id.
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Birnbaum standing limitations
might not apply as a bar to an
2
action for injunctive relief.1

11

More recent decisions call the validity of the Porco holding
into question, at least insofar as it relied upon lOb-5's unavailability in corporate mismanagement cases. 12 1 Bailey v. Meister
Brau, Inc. ,122 demonstrates the significance of lOb-5 when a control premium plays a part in a fraudulent scheme. In that case,
the minority shareholder, suing derivatively, successfully challenged the Black corporation's sale of its assets in exchange for
Meister Brau stock, which had a market value significantly below
that of Black's assets. As part of the deal, Meister Brau purchased Black stock from Black's controlling shareholders at a significant premium. The Birnbaum requirement was satisfied because the nondisclosure concerned the purchase of the Meister
Brau stock by the Black corporation, which was the nominal
plaintiff. 1 23 The court held that the majority shareholder was
liable under 10b-5 for the loss incurred upon the sale of its assets
because it failed to disclose its conflict of interest to Black's other
shareholders. 24 Thus, the receipt of the premium created the
conflict of interest that lOb-5 requires to be disclosed. The court
did not discuss, however, how such nondisclosure to minority
shareholders could proximately cause any damages to the corporation.
In 1970, the Fifth Circuit, in two derivative actions, faced
the question of 1Ob-5's applicability to transfers of control allegedly detrimental to the minority. 12 5 In both instances the
court refused to sustain the defendants' motions to dismiss, relying on the puppet-puppeteer relationship that enabled the controlling shareholders to manipulate the board of directors in
12 6
negotiating a transfer of control through a merger agreement.
120 Id. at 406 (citing Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 546 (2d
Cir. 1967)).
121See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12
(1971); Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380 (2d Cir. 1974). But see,
Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 97 S. Ct. 1292 (1977). The relevant cases are more fully
discussed in Lipton, Sale of Corporate Control: Going Private, 31 Bus. LAW. 1689 (1976);
Schwartz, supra note 95.
122 535 F.2d 982 (7th Cir. 1976).
123Id. at 992.
24
1 Id. at 993.
125 Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1970); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d
792 (5th Cir. 1970).
126 Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819, 827 (5th Cir. 1970), quoted in Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 809-10 (5th Cir. 1970). See also Harman v. Willbern, 374 F. Supp.
1149 (D. Kan. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 1333 (10th Cir. 1975), which according to one
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The damage alleged flowed primarily from the subsequent looting activities by the purchaser of control and did not arise out of
the sale or premium directly.' 27 Although the Birnbaum-Blue Chip
requirement was held satisfied by the corporation's proposed
merger, 1 28 it is questionable whether this type of harm is closely
enough connected to the sale or purchase of securities to meet
the requirement as the courts will eventually construe it.
At least when receipt of a control premium is an integral
part in schemes to defraud the corporation whose control was
sold, private lOb-5 damage actions still may be viable. Given the
Supreme Court's recent eagerness to limit the scope of 1Ob-5
actions 1 29 and the tenuous relationship between the sale and the
alleged damages, however, the future of such lOb-5 actions cannot be considered bright. The dark outlook for private damage
actions under lOb-5 in most control premium situations should
not necessarily be taken as an indication of its overall impotence.
In addition to its use as an enforcement, compliance, and remedial device in the hands of the Commission and as a basis for
privately instigated injunctive relief, the rule has paved the way
for the Exchange Act's tender offer antifraud provisions. 31,
C. The Williams Act-FederalRegulation
of Tender Offers
One result of the corporate fusion movement of the 1960's
was the use of cash tender offers directly to the target company's
shareholders as an alternative to the more conventional statutory
merger route that required compliance with the Exchange Act's
proxy rules. 13 1 The vociferousness with which such battles were
waged both publicly and privately led to the 1968 Congressional
enactment of the Williams Act amendments to the Exchange
commentator, "suggested that a rule 10b-5 claim is appropriate where the sale and
control and subsequent looting of the corporation might be viewed as part of one
scheme." Lipton, supra note 121, at 1693.
127 Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819, 822-23 (5th Cir. 1970); Herpich v. Wallace, 430
F.2d 792, 809-10 (5th Cir. 1970).
128 Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819, 827 (5th Cir. 1970); Herpich v. Wallace, 430
F.2d 792, 810 (5th Cir. 1970).
129 See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 97 S. Ct. 1292 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
13 See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970), which is patterned on the language of the rule.
131 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 to .14a-103 (1976). Section 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)
(1970), and Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1976), require full disclosure for all
proxy solicitation materials of companies that are subject to the reporting requirements
of§ 12 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1970).
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Act.1 32 Because the scope of these amendments extends beyond
the conventional cash tender offer, they may affect control premiums in certain situations.
In Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co.,133 Justice Traynor ordered
what was tantamount to a forced tender offer to the minority to
accomplish a pro rata distribution of the invalid control premium. Professor Andrews' proposal that all control premiums be
distributed on a pro rata basis to all shareholders would have the
same effect. 1 34 The 1968 amendments include both reporting
and disclosure requirements that the Supreme Court has indicated may be the basis of an implied private right of action by a
shareholder of the target company.' 35 The Act may be of significance in the traditional sale-of-control situations by the direct
application of its provisions. The relief available under the Act
might also be used by analogy to focus upon the fiduciary duties
and potential liabilities of the purchaser, thereby creating additional remedies for the minority.
More specifically, section 14(d) provides minimum requirements for "a tender offer for, or a request or invitation for
tenders of," any equity security registered under section 12 of
the Exchange Act. 13 6 Similarly, section 14(e), which is not limited
to registered securities, expressly applies 10b-5 standards to all
13
parties to a "tender offer or request or invitation for tenders.' 1
132 Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e),
n(d)-(f) (1970)). The Williams Act Amendments cover various reporting and disclosure
provisions that go far beyond the scope of this Article. See generally E. ARANOW &
H. EiNHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL (1973); Bromberg, The Securities

Law of Tender Offers, 15 N.Y.L.F. 462 (1969); Hamilton, Some Reflections on Cash Tender
Offer Legislation, 15 N.Y.L.F. 269 (1969).
1331 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969), discussed at text accompanying notes 74-80 supra.
134 Andrews, supra note 1.
133 In Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 97 S. Ct. 926 (1977) the Court held that

the Williams Act did not create a private damage remedy in the hands of a tender
offeror. However, the Court strongly indicated that such relief would be available to a
shareholder of the target company. See id. at 941-44. In the control premium situation it
would be the target company shareholder who would be asserting his minority rights.
In the course of its opinion the Court repeatedly stressed the fact that the Act was
directed at the protection of investors (i.e. tender offerees) rather than at tender offerors. Id. at 941-50. In fact, the dissent noted that "[n]o one seriously questions the
premise that Congress implicitly created a private right of action when it enacted § 14(e)
in 1968." Id. at 956 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). The Court expressly stated
that it was not facing that issue in its denial of the Piper plaintiff's claim. Id. at n.28. In
addition to a damage pending the Court has acknowledged the potential of private
injunctive relief. Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Co., 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
131 15 U.S.C. § 78n (d) (1970); see id. § 781(g)(1) (1970) (scope of the Act's registration requirements).
131 Id. § 78n(e) (1970). For a discussion of the cases dealing with the private right of

1977]

TRANSFERS OF CORPORATE CONTROL

For example, in Ahmanson 1 38 nineteen individual defendants, acting in concert, transferred their aggregated eighty-five percent
control block in the United Savings and Loan Association to
their conduit United Financial for subsequent distribution to the
public. If United Financial's purchases were to fall within the
scope of the Act's coverage, the Association's minority shareholders would have two potential federal remedies. If the securities in question were subject to the Exchange Act's registration
and reporting requirements, the minority would have the protection of section 14(d),'1 39 which requires full disclosure to all
shareholders in addition to the filing with the SEC of all related
communications with the tender offerees 4" This gives the
minority notice of the impending public offering and a chance to
tender their shares to the newly formed holding company on the
same basis as the majority. Section 14(d)(6) provides that all tenderers must be given the opportunity to share equally on a pro
4
rata basis.' '

Even if the securities in question were not registered and
therefore not subject to section 14(d)'s requirements, section
14(e) would still apply. In addition to requiring full and honest
disclosure, section 14(e), like its model, rule lOb-5, prohibits
"fraudulent" and "deceptive" acts.' 4 2 The plaintiff in a section
14(e) action would not necessarily be subject to lOb-5's purchaser-seller requirement. If the plaintiff can establish that the
receipt of an excessive control premium is a breach of duty under the common law, the same act could constitute a "fraudulent" or "deceptive" practice prohibited by section 14(e).
The availability of these alternatives depends on the scope
of the Williams amendments' coverage. The threshold question
is what is a "tender offer" within the context of the Williams Act.
Unfortunately, the Act is silent concerning this crucial issue.
Congress considered and rejected 14 3 the possibility of providing
action and scope of relief under § 14(e), see generally Note, Chris-Craft: The Uncertain
Evolution of Section 14(e), 76 COLUM. L. REV. 634 (1976).
1381 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969).
139 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1970).
14 Id. § 78n(d)(1) (1970). For the corresponding SEC rules contained in Regulation
14D and Schedule 14D that spell out the minimum disclosure requirements, see 17
C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-I to .14d-101 (1976).
141 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1970).
141 Id. § 78n(e) (1970).
143Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership and in Corporate Takeover Bids. Hearings on S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currenc,, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 131 (1967) (statement of Arthur Fleischer, Jr.).
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objective definitions, such as those in the proposed Federal Securities Code, 14 4 thus indicating a Congressional intent to keep
the definition flexible and to leave the issue to the SEC and
ultimately to the courts. The SEC has likewise declined to set
objective standards, 145 and instead has endorsed a flexible, fairly
broad concept of what a tender offer is:
The Commission's position should in no way be construed
to mean that the term applies only to so-called conventional
tender offers whereby an offer is published by a person
requesting that all or a portion of a class of a company's
securities be deposited during a fixed period of time so
that such person may purchase such securities at a
specified price (whether cash and/or securities) and subject to specified conditions. But rather, the term is to be
interpreted flexibly and applies to special bids; purchases resulting from widespread solicitations by means
of mailings, telephone calls and personal visits; and any
transaction where the conduct of the person seeking
control causes pressures to be put on shareholders simi146
lar to those attendant to a conventional tender offer.
In 1968, the SEC issued a release stating that a special bid
-the placing on the exchange of a bid for a specified large
number of shares at a fixed price-would be considered to con144 The American Law Institute's proposed Federal Securities Code, which would
substantially follow the provisions of the Williams Act in most respects, provides the
following definition: " 'Tender request' means an offer to buy a security, or a solicitation of an offer to sell a security, that is directed to more than thirty-five persons ......
ALI FED. SEC. CODE 299.9(a) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1972). In drafting the section Professor Loss acknowledged the "public connotation" of "tender offer" under the current
legislation but also was aware of the open-ended nature of the Act in its present form;
his solution was to select an arbitrary cutoff point. Id. Comment 1.
Some state statutes on tender offers also provide objective standards. E.g., DEL.
CODE tit. 8, § 203(c)(2) (1976); Ky. REV. STAT. § 292.560 (Supp. 1976). See generally
1977 SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION 29 (1976); Wilner & Landy, The Tender Trap: State
Takeover Statutes and Their Constitutionality, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1976); Report, State
Takeover Statutes and the Williams Act, 32 Bus. LAw. 187 (1976).
141 [T]he Commission's position at this time is that a definition of the term
"tender offer" is neither appropriate nor necessary. This position is premised
on the dynamic nature of these transactions and the need of the Commission
to remain flexible in determining what types of transactions, either present or
yet to be devised, are or should be encompassed by the term. Therefore, the
Commission specifically declines to propose a definition of the term "tender
offer."
SEC Release No. 33-5731, 41 Fed. Reg. 33,004, 33,005 (1976), in [Current] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH)
80,659, at 86,696.
146 Id. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis supplied).
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stitute a tender offer. 14 7 In 1971, the Commission issued a no
action response under section 14(d) when the holder of a substantial ownership interest in the target company planned to
purchase additional shares on the open market with an eye toward gaining fifty percent control.' 48 In contrast, less than one
month later, the Commission, in a Staff Reply, commented:
[Y]ou note that the term "tender offer" is not defined in
section 14(d) of the Act or the rules thereunder. It is
not limited to the classical "tender offer" where the person desiring to acquire shares makes a public invitation
or a written offer to the shareholders to render their
shares. Nor is there a requirement that the shares be
rendered through a depository. The change in control may
be effected by direct purchasefrom shareholders without a public or written invitationfor tenders having been made.' 4 9
The earliest case examining the definition of tender offer
involved the issue of section 14(e)'s applicability to a two-step
corporate reorganization. 15 In holding that the reorganization
was not a tender offer, the court noted that although there is no
statutory definition, "[t]he legislative history ... makes clear that
the type of activity intended to be regulated ...is the acquisition
of control of a corporation by outsiders through the purchase of
its shares.' 15 1 The court thus stressed the absence of both an
offer by outsiders and a transfer of control, because the share
ownership, subject to the dissenters' exercise of their appraisal
52
rights, was the same as it had been prior to the reorganization.
" SEC Release No. 34-8392, 33 Fed. Reg. 14,109 (1968). See generally E. ARANOW
& H. EINHORN, supra note 132, at 70-7 1.
148American Gen. Ins. Co., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
78,588 (SEC Staff Reply).
149Cattlemen's Inv. Co., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
78,775, at 81,627 (SEC Staff Reply) (emphasis supplied). This controversy reached
the courts in Cattlemen's Inv. Co. v. Fears, 343 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D. Okla. 1972), discussed at text accompanying notes 160-61 infra.
15"Dyer v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co., 336 F. Supp. 890 (N.D. Me. 1971).
151 Id. at 907.
152Id. at 909. This narrow reading was confirmed by the Fifth Circuit in Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974):
The lesson we read in Dyer is not that there may not be a friendly tender offer.
Rather, it is that a corporation does not become a tender offeror simply by
proposing a paper exchange of securities. There must be contemplated some
change of control. If actual control does not shift, it is difficult to see why the
shareholder needs the protection of Section 14(e). He has what he had before,
in reality if not in form.
Id. at 599.
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Gulf & Western Industries, Inc. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea
Co., 153 was the first case deciding the issue of tender offer definition in the context of open-market purchases. The court held
that the purchases were not subject to section 14(d)'s disclosure
requirements, because they had fallen short of the statute's five
percent threshold.1 54 Two months later, a New Jersey District
Court, in Water & Wall Associates, Inc. v. American Consumer Industries, Inc., 155 refused to grant a preliminary injunction preventing
Water & Wall from soliciting proxies, making a conventional
tender offer, or exercising any incidents of ownership over
53,253 shares of stock recently purchased by Water & Wall on
the open market. 5 6 It was argued that Water & Wall was subject
to section 14(e) because it planned a series of open-market
purchases of more than five percent of the shares in the target
company with an eye toward control. The court concluded that
the purchases did not come within the purview of section 14(e),
relying on the following "definition" in the Williams Act's legislative history:
The offer normally consists of a bid by an individual or group to buy shares of a company-usually at
a price higher than the current market price. Those
accepting the offer are said to tender their stock for
purchase. The person making the offer obligates himself to purchase all or a specified portion of the tendered shares .... 157
The failure of the court to consider the SEC statement concerning the inclusion of certain open-market purchases in the definition of tender offer 158 and the court's finding of independent
grounds on which to base the denial of the injunction 1 59 weaken
Water & Wall's precedential value.
An Oklahoma district court, in Cattlemen's Investment Co. v.
Fears,'16 " held that a series of privately negotiated transactions
153 356 F. Supp. 1066 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973).
154 Id. at 1074.

[1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,943 (D.N.J. 1973).
In addition to the claim under § 14(e), relief was sought under §§ 10(b), 13(d),
14(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), m(d), n(a) (1970).
"I S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967); H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1968), reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2811.
"' SEC Release No. 34-8392, 33 Fed. Reg. 14,109 (1968).
"9 [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 93,943, at 93,759-60.
16 343 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D. Okla. 1972).
's
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constituted a tender offer. The court first stressed that remedial
legislation should be given a liberal interpretation and then relied upon the importance of an "unhurried investment decision"
16 1
and of "assur[ing] fair treatment.'
The most recent decision, and the only appellate decision,
on this definitional problem is Smallwood v. PearlBrewing Co.,162
which raised "a variety of difficult questions" under the Exchange Act in the context of a corporate merger that had been
supported by the target company's management. 163 The section
14(e) claim was predicated upon a communication from the
would-be surviving corporation to the shareholder of the target
company, including a draft of the proposed exchange prospectus and an explanation of how the sell-out provision of the
proposed merger would be handled.' 64 In considering whether
this communication was subject to scrutiny under section 14(e),
the court not only rejected the defense that a tender offer must
involve a "hostile bid opposed by incumbent management,"' 6 5 but
also indicated that the need for Williams Act protection is "even
greater" when dealing with a "friendly" takeover attempt. 1 66 The
court also emphasized the need for Williams Act regulation because the shareholders of the target company were being asked
to make a "significant investment decision for which information
and reflection are essential.'

67

In the typical control premium

case, the minority would not make any investment decisions,
because only the control block is sold. Although the Smallwood
court relied on this factor, it did not indicate that its absence
would preclude application of the Williams Act.
From the foregoing legislative history, SEC statements, and
judicial decisions, it is possible to glean some general guidelines
for determining whether a given transaction is within the statutory concept of "tender offer." Clearly, the definition goes
beyond conventional tender offers and, in certain circumstances
will apply to both privately negotiated transactions and openmarket purchases. The legislative history and decisions by the
courts and the SEC also indicate that a key factor is a shift in
161

/d.at 1251.
F.2d 579 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974).
163Id. at 584, 585-89.
162489

164 Id. at 586-87.
165 Id.

at 597 (emphasis in original) (quoting Brief for Appellees at 10).
at 598.
167 Id. at 599.
166Id.
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control by the acquisition or by a series of acquisitions of a block
of shares by an outsider. Finally, there is the necessity for full
and honest disclosure when the shareholders of the target company are asked to make an investment decision. All of the factors
listed above, except for the last, 168 could be present in any sale of
control situation.
Although there is no express minimum number of tender
offerees, it is unlikely that the sanctions of sections 14(d) and
14(e) apply to an isolated transfer of a controlling block of stock.
Accordingly, any remedies found in the Act itself would not
apply to all control premium situations. The analogy exists, however, and may give guidance to courts willing to adopt a more
imaginative approach under state law.
Two aspects of the Williams Act warrant special attention by
state courts employing this analogy. The first is the requirement
mentioned above that tender offerors make their offers pro rata
to all shareholders. The second is the applicability of the Act's
proscriptions to the tender offeror as well as to the management
of the target company.' 69 Purchaser liability may be inconsistent
with state law theories that require the seller to disgorge a control premium. To the extent that relief is premised on the seller's
appropriation of a corporate asset such as Newport's steel allocation in Perlman v. Feldmann,' 7 once the minority has been made
whole by the seller of control, the courts may be obliged to say
that because the purchaser paid for the asset it is now his. This
would give the purchaser a license to use it in such a way that
would otherwise constitute a breach of fiduciary duty to the
minority or to the corporation itself.
There are, however, alternative theories for imposing state
liability on the purchaser. Rather than rely upon some type of
threshold relationship to the corporation, the courts could rely
upon traditional tort principles. When there is a negotiated sale
of control at an excessive premium, the purchaser could be held
liable on an equal basis as a joint tortfeasor. Another similar
method would allocate such joint liability on a conspiracy theory
because it clearly takes both the purchaser and seller acting in
168Of course, if a pro rata offering is required, all shareholders have an investment
decision requiring full disclosure.
169 Section 14(e) covers all communications issued "in connection with any tender
offer or request or invitation for tenders." 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970).
170219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
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concert in order to effectuate a transfer of control at an excessive premium.

17 1

Although more than eight years have elapsed since the passage of the Williams Act, the judicial refinements are still in their
incipiency. It is thus not unlikely that some of the questions
raised herein will be answered in such a way as to give the minority shareholders a more viable weapon against excessive control
premiums.
IV.

THE INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT-ANOTHER
APPROACH TO THE CONTROL PREMIUM

The Investment Company Act of 1940172 places express
limitations upon the receipt of a premium based on the transfer
of controlling interests in an investment adviser to a mutual fund
or investment company. Like the Williams Act, it may have significance beyond the scope of the statute because it is a congressional statement concerning the proper safeguards against evils
that may accompany the transfer of control for a premium. With
respect to an assignment of the advisory contract, unlike the
more traditional sale-of-control case, the injured shareholders do
not complain about the transfer of a controlling block of stock in
their own corporation. Instead, their complaint is based on a
more straightforward sale-of-a-corporate-asset theory, viewing
future earnings under the investment advisory contract as a
proper matter for the fund to decide. This might be analogized
to the ability to control the allocation of steel in Perlman.7 3
The Act also provides that any "direct or indirect" transfer
of a controlling block of shares in the investment adviser or
74
affiliate constitutes an assignment of the advisory contract.1
And the investment advisory contract automatically terminates
when there is an assignment of the contract. 1 75 Accordingly,
when control in the adviser is sold at a premium and the investment company reinstates the advisory contract, there is an express approval of the transfer of control for a premium. This
investment advisory contract premium is analogous to the sale of
171 For an example of the conspiracy analogy as the basis for attacking both the
seller and purchaser of control, see Mayflower Hotel Stockholders Protective Comm. v.
Mayflower Hotel Corp., 193 F.2d 666, 668-71 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
172 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-52 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
173 See text accompanying notes 60-62 supra.
174 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(4) (1970).
75
' Id. § 80a-15(a)(4) (1970).
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a corporate office insofar as the former adviser is receiving a
premium for choosing its successor, a decision that, at least in
form, lies in the hands of the investment company's directors
and shareholders. Absent the Act's provisions, this premium
might be prohibited by the common law of most states.
The Act's current provisions on control premiums were
added in 1975 in response to the uncertainty generated by decisions under the prior law. These amendments, though only a
minor segment of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975,176
are significant because they are the only direct congressional
statement on control premiums, though not in the conventional
control premium context.
Two judicial decisions provided the backdrop to the 1975
Amendments. In the first, SEC v. Insurance Securities, Inc., 177 the
Ninth Circuit refused an injunction sought by the SEC against
the sale of a controlling interest in the defendant investment
adviser at a price more than twenty-five times the net asset value.
The court looked to the Investment Company Act's silence on
the issue and reasoned that Congress had determined that section 15(a)(4)'s requirement that the investment company renew
the advisory contract provides adequate protection against the
potential abuses resulting from this type of transaction. 17 8 The
court concluded that the SEC had not shown the "gross misconduct" or "gross abuse" then required by the Act 1 79 for suits instituted by the Commission. 18 1 Subsequently, in the 1970 Securities
Acts Amendments, Congress deleted the "gross misconduct" and
"gross abuse" language and allowed the SEC to bring suit when
there is "a breach of fiduciary duty involving personal miscon'1 8 1
duct in respect of any registered investment company.'
In the second decision, Rosenfeld v. Black,' 82 the share'

Act of June 4, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975).

17 254 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1958).

17 Id. at 651. The court also stated that a significant portion of the sale price was
based on anticipation of future fees from the investment company pursuant to the
advisory contract and that such profits are not an asset of the investment company.
Thus, receipt of a premium could not constitute a breach of the fiduciary duty not to
profit from the sale of a corporate asset. Id. at 650-51.
719
Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, tit. I, § 36, 54 Stat. 841 (current
version at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a) (1970)).

1811254 F.2d at 651.

.8115 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a) (1970) (amending Investment Company Act of 1940, ch.
686, tit. I, § 36, 54 Stat. 841).
182445 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. dismissed sub nom. Lazard Freres & Co. v.
Rosenfeld, 409 U.S. 802 (1972).
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holders of the Lazard Fund sued the fund's former investment
adviser to recover a premium received in consideration for assignment of the advisory contract. The Second Circuit reversed
the District Court's grant of summary judgment for the defendants. The court's opinion does not make clear the precise basis
of this decision,183 but it does contain broad statements concerning the investment adviser's fiduciary duty and corresponding
84
obligation not to profit personally from a sale of its office.1
Shortly after the Rosenfeld decision, SEC Chairman William
J. Casey indicated that a broad reading of the Second Circuit's
opinion might impose an undue hardship on the investment
company industry and that perhaps some corrective legislation
was needed. 8 5 The Investment Company Institute (ICI), an industry trade association, responded quickly by submitting to the
Senate a proposed amendment to section 15 of the Act that
would expressly sanction the receipt of a premium by the outgoing investment adviser unless the result would be to impose an
"unfair burden" upon the underlying investment company.' 8 6
The SEC decided that the "unfair burden" standard, by itself, did not adequately resolve the existing uncertainty and decided to submit its own draft legislation.' 8 7 The ensuing proposal, submitted to both the House and Senate, 8 8 sanctioned the
receipt of any consideration for the assignment of the advisory
contract subject to certain conditions. The proposed legislation
required an independent board of directors for five years and
183 The opinion could be read as supporting recovery for a direct violation of the
Investment Company Act, id. at 1344-48, for violation of common law principles of
fiduciary obligations as defined by the Investment Company Act, id. at 1342, for violation of the proxy rules of the 1934 Exchange Act, id. at 1349, or for any combination
of the above.
184 For example:
If Lazard did not wish to continue as adivser and chose to recommend a successor and assist in the latter's installation, it was obliged to forego personal
gain from the change of office, no matter how deeply or rightly it was convinced it had made the best possible choice. It is wholly immaterial that the
prospect of receiving future management fees if it had continued as an adviser
would have been an asset of Lazard rather than of the Fund ....
Id. at 1343 (footnote omitted).
185N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1971, § 3, at 3, col. 1. See generally, Markham, The Sale of
Advisory Contracts-Rosenfeld v. Black, 19 N.Y.L.F. 61, 75-81 (1973) (discussion of the
background of the congressional action and an examination of the Rosenfeld issue).
186 The proposal is quoted by the Second Circuit in Newman v. Stein, 464 F.2d
689, 695-96 (2d Cir. 1972).
187 Letter from SEC Chairman William J. Casey to Senator Harrison J. Williams, Jr.
(Mar. 10, 1972), reprinted in [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
78,671 [hereinafter cited as Letter].
188H.R. 15304, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); S. 3681, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
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incorporated the "unfair burden" proviso, although without the
precise definition that the Chairman had promised in his March
1 89
1972 letter to the Senate.
Senator Williams greeted the SEC proposal with enthusiasm
and with embellishments. 911 Under the Williams legislation, in
order to retain the advisory contract transfer premium it would
have to be shown that no "unfair burden" resulted and that
three-fourths of the investment company's board were independent of the predecessor or successor investment adviser. The
SEC considered this solution satisfactory insofar as the bill "resolved" the "uncertainty created by the possible implications of
the Rosenfeld decision."' 19 1
The Senate passed the proposed amendment to section 15
in 1973, and the bill was introduced in the House.' 92 The bill
was reintroduced and was eventually passed by both the Senate
and the House as a part of the Securities Acts Amendments of
1975.193 Thus, the Act permits receipt of such a premium only if
two conditions are met. First, seventy-five percent of the fund's
board must be composed of independent directors for a period
of three years after the contract's assignment. 194 More specifically, three-quarters of the directors must not be "interested persons" of the old or new advisory company. 195 This provision was
designed to safeguard the fund's shareholders against selfdealing by either the old or new investment adviser. 19 6 The provision may fall short of its mark because it is limited to directors
and does not preclude "interested persons" from functioning as
officers of the fund. Also, although protection at the board level
'9 Letter, supra note 187.
19oS. 4071, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) (reintroduced as S.470, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973)). See Hearings on S. 470 and S. 488 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter

cited as 1973 Senate Hearings]. For a critical, comparison of this and the SEC's earlier
version, see Markham, supra note 185, at 77-80.
191

1973 Senate Hearings, supra note 190, at 230.

192 H.R. 10570, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
19 Act of June 4, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975). The Investment Act
amendment is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(f)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
194 15 U.S.C. § 80(a)-15(f)(A) (Supp. V 1975).
195"Interested person" is defined in § 2(a)(19) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19)
(1970), and includes employees, officers, and agents of the investment company; but
such status is not attained merely by owning stock or holding a director's seat. An
interested person of an investment adviser, on the other hand, expressly includes any
controlling person of the adviser or any person who knowingly has a beneficial interest
in a security issued by the adviser. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19)(B)(iii) (1970).
196E.g., SENATE COMM. ON

BANKING AND

URBAN

AFFAIRS,

REPORT ON THE SECU-

RITIES ACTS AMENDMENTS OF 1975, S. REP. No. 94-75, 94th Cong., IstSess. 74 (1975).
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is seemingly substantial because the board is charged with the
management of the investment company, it is a very thin shield
given the SEC's finding that general industry practice allows the
adviser to perform the roles traditionally carried out by a
1 97
company's board of directors.
The second condition to the validity of a control premium is
that "there is not imposed an unfair burden on such company as a
result of such transaction or any express or implied terms, conditions, or understandings applicable thereto."' 98 Once again we
are faced with the magic words without an explicit definition.
The only proper conclusion is that Congress has decided to leave
the decision to the courts, for the closest the Act comes to providing some meaning for "unfair burden" is in an example provided by section 15(f)(2)(B):
For the purpose of paragraph (1)(B) of this subsection,
an unfair burden on a registered investment company
includes any arrangement, during the two-year period
after the date on which any such transaction occurs,
whereby the investment adviser or corporate trustee or
predecessor or successor investment advisers or corporate trustee or any interested person of any such adivser
or any such corporate trustee receives or is entitled to
receive any compensation directly or indirectly (i) from
any person in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities or other property to, from, or on behalf of
such company, other than bona fide ordinary compensation as principal underwriter for such company, or (ii)
from such company or its security holders for other
than bona fide investment advisory or other services. 199
The subsection's language fails to give even a clear indication of the parameters of "bona fide ordinary compensation."
197

REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON THE PUBLIC POLICY

IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT COMPANY GROWTH,

H.R. REP. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d

Sess. (1966).
19815 U.S.C. § 80a-15(f)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1975) (emphasis supplied).
199d. § 80a-15(f)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1975). In one of its legislative memoranda, the
Commission gave one example of the type of non-bona-fide compensation at which the
subsection is directed: "Such a burden could arise, for example, where the transaction
involves an arrangement entitling an interested person of an investment adivser to receive brokerage commissions for executing the investment company's portfolio transactions." Hearings on H.R. 10570 and H.R. 13986 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and
Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 39
(1974). Once again, would not such an arrangement clearly be violative of the adviser's
fiduciary obligations even without this provision?
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An adviser cannot loot the underlying fund without violating
subsection (2)(B); but such action would almost certainly violate
the high fiduciary standards embodied in the rest of the 1940
legislation. Clearly, Congress did not intend that this example
exhaust the class of transactions that impose an "unfair burden"
because the subsection provides only that this class "includes" the
arrangements for non-bona-fide compensation. Thus, the question what other transactions impose an "unfair burden" remains.
The key question is whether the "unfair burden" safeguard
can be employed to put a check on excessive premiums without
any direct evidence of the foregoing type -of arrangments between the outgoing and incoming advisers. A court could still
utilize the analysis employed in Perlman and its progeny to determine whether there is an "unfair burden"-by establishing
what would be the fair value of expected future "bona fide"
adviser remuneration and then viewing any excess as an "unfair
burden" under subsection (f)(1)(B). An alternative is to consider
such an excess in the transfer price as raising a presumption in
favor of the existence of the type of arrangement expressly forbidden under the terms of subsection (f)(2)(B), thereby placing
the burden on the seller and purchaser of control to prove the
fairness of the transaction. In effect, this would impose a
fiduciary duty on those involved in the transfer of control in the
advisory corporation.'" The possibility remains, however, that
courts, through overreliance on section 15(f)(2)(B), may insulate
control premiums from any effective attack. The trend of the
future is therefore unpredictable.
V.

CONCLUSION-AN ECLECTIC PROPOSAL

The courts' refusal to adopt the Berle-Bayne approach that
control premiums are per se invalid has left an analytical morass
of hybrid theories that may be utilized to recapture a control
premium. Each theory may seem justified by the facts of a particular case, but when considered collectively, they fall far short
of forming a coherent body of law. The absence of a consistent
framework has resulted in a series of obstacles for the unwary
corporate planner as well as some tools for the wily corporate
litigator. More than forty years have passed since Berle's initial

200 See text accompanying note 21 supra.
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articulation of his corporate asset theory2 "1 and more than thirty
years since the first modern day control premium cases. 2112 The
time has come for the courts and/or Congress and state legislatures to establish order in the law relating to control premiums.
The judicial inconsistency may be attributable to the courts'
failure to agree upon a general treatment of control premiums.
The courts have yet to decide whether the Berle-Bayne analysis
really warrants acceptance. Although there has been a universal
2 3
rejection of the per se approachy
1 both the judicial and legislative treatment have shown great concern with the abuses that
frequently accompany control transfer situations. The courts
and legislatures have apparently accepted some of the theoretical
underpinnings of the theories of Professors Berle and Bayne,
although rejecting their ultimate solutions.
The increasing willingness of courts to invalidate control
premiums 20 4 reflects a growing affinity to the Berle-Bayne
analysis. Yet rather than face the problem directly, the courts
have found premiums invalid by stretching and distorting the
more traditional theories of insider liability such as the wasting
of a distinct corporate asset or the taking of a corporate opportunity. The refusal of the courts to adhere to the per se
approach can be traced to their continued sensitivity to the
poignant arguments that some control premiums represent
legitimate economic rewards and not the oppression of mi2 5
nority shareholders. 11
Predictability for the corporate practitioner can be accom6 and
plished by following the advice of Professor Andrews 2 11
fashioning all control transfer transactions in the mode of a tender offer to all on a pro rata basis. This fails to take account of
the economic arguments in favor of the premium, even though
it does guarantee that the controlling shareholder will realize a
larger per capita share of the control premium than would the
201 A. BERLE & G.

MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY

(1932).
202E.g., Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa.
1940); Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1941); see text accompanying
notes 42-44 & 56-59 supra.
203 See text accompanying notes 2-5 supra.
204 E.g., Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., I Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr.
592 (1969); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 75 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1295, 328 N.E.2d 505
(1975); see text accompanying notes 74-93 supra.
205See Andrews, supra note 1, at 526.
206 Id.
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other tendering shareholders. Any other solution by a corporate
planner today would present a risk that the control transaction
might be attacked on the basis of any of the potential weapons
previously discussed.
The courts could preserve a large degree of the needed
flexibility while increasing predictability of result by isolating
particular situations suitable for a per se approach and instituting safeguards in other cases that would permit the retention of
a premium without prejudicing the rights of the minority
shareholders or the corporate entity. When the potential for
abuse is great, the per se approach should be adopted.
Sales of control in the very closely held concern such as the
incorporated family business or farm is one such context. When
there are only a few shareholders, often no practically ascertainable market value can fairly be placed on the shares. Accordingly, it would be impractical for the courts to try to determine
what portion of a premium is reasonable. The increasing realization that the family corporate venture warrants partnership-like
treatment in several respects 2117 provides additional support for
the adoption of the per se recapture rule for control premiums
in this context. In a partnership, the controlling general partner
cannot in practice transfer his or her interest without obtaining
the consent of all remaining partners. 0 8 Prohibiting the sale of a
controlling block in a very closely held corporation for more
than its per share value, unless, of course, the same offer is made
to all shareholders, protects the minority while preserving the
reasonably free transferability of corporate equity interests.
Even in the absence of such a judicially enforced rule, corporate counsel representing the minority interests can achieve
similar protection through the use of restrictions on share transfers, such as calling for a right of first refusal. 21 1 9 Similarly, such
207 See text accompanying notes 88-94 supra. For an explanation of the availability
of partnership tax treatment to closely held corporations under subchapter S, see I Z.
CAVITCH,

BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 3.01 [22] (1976).

Although the Uniform Partnership Act provides that a conveyance of a
partner's interest does not of itself dissolve a general partnership, UNIFORI
PARTNERSHIP ACT § 27(a), the remaining partners may agree to dissolve the partnership
without breach of contract, id. § 31(l)(c). Thus, a general partner selling a controlling
interest in the partnership needs the consent of the remaining partners to prevent dissolution. The retirement, death, or insanity of a general partner dissolves a limited
partnership, unless the business is continued by the remaining general partners either
under a right to do so stated in the certificate, or with the consent of all members.
UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 20.
219 Other types of transfer restraints include buy-out arrangements and redemption
208
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restrictions should also be drafted to reflect the minority's right
to share in the control premium in the event that they elect not
to exercise their rights to maintain family or existing ownership.
Adoption of the per se approach would encourage such arrangements to avoid the need for litigation over whether a given
sale price represents a control premium.
At the other end of the spectrum, a similarly objective approach is also warranted. The potential unfairness is equally
serious in sales of control of large publicly held corporations.
The Williams Act clearly evidences concern for open-market acquisitions of control, and similar considerations would appear to
call for regulation of all control premium situations involving
companies large enough to be subject to the Exchange Act's
reporting requirements. 2 " Although all such control transactions are arguably subject to scrutiny under lOb-5, 2 1 x the availability of private lOb-5 damage actions in this area is limited,
and decisions under the rule have not supplied the desired
level of predictability. Expansion of the Williams Act to cover
every control-related transaction would achieve a desirable balance. The antifraud provisions of section 14(e) 212 provide the

same type of flexibility-and hence unpredictability-as would
rule lOb-5, while the other reporting and disclosure provisions
of the Williams Act would provide at least a minimum level of
protection for other investors.
The intentional open-endedness of the statutory definition
of "tender offer" would permit adoption of the proposed expansion through judicial interpretation of the statute's reach. It
would be preferable, however, for the SEC or Congress to define
"tender offer" as extending to all control premium situations
involving a reporting company. Without necessarily resolving the
ultimate question whether the premium should be disgorged,
this would guarantee adequate safeguards through the disclosure rules as well as through the procedures for making the
"tender offer"-or, as proposed here, the "control transaction."
The existence of a readily identifiable market for the shares of a
reporting company, unlike the very closely held concern discussed above, would render the isolation of a "reasonable preprovisions in the share certificates. See generally, e.g., 2 F. ONEAL, Supra note 1, at §§
7.01-.17.
21, 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1) (1970).
21 See text accompanying notes 107-30 supra.
212 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970).
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mium" more practical, thus obviating the need for a per se approach.
The foregoing suggestions cover two extremes-the very
large corporation and the very small. The remaining question is
how to treat a corporation that has more than a handful of
shareholders but that is not of such substantial size nor so widely
held as to be a reporting company under the 1934 Act. One
possibility would be to leave this vast middle ground to the
numerous common law doctrines as they now exist. This could
be supported on the theory that any more predictability would
result in an undue reduction of flexibility. An equally effective
balance could be maintained by using the approach taken in the
recent amendments to the Investment Company Act. 2 13 The result would be accomplished by incorporating the Act's subjective
safeguards as embodied in the "unfair burden" standard and by
looking to the more objective requirement of an independent
board of directors for a stated period of years following the
control premium transaction.
This independent board of directors would not deny the
control purchaser representation on the board. It would, however, provide an additional check against self-dealing. Because
the control purchaser would still be in a position to introduce
new corporate policies, the valid purposes that might lead such a
purchaser to pay a premium would be preserved. On the other
side of the balance, the disinterested board of directors could
prevent many of the types of mismanagement that have confronted the courts in the control premium cases. 214
An independent board could be defined as one in which
three-quarters or, alternatively, two-thirds of its members owe
no allegiance to either the control seller or the control purchaser. Although all directors are bound to make their decisions
solely for the corporation's benefit, the exigencies of the situation clearly call for closer scrutiny. The membership of such an
independent board could be selected according to standards that
parallel those of the Investment Company Act. Whereas the
Act's protections are embodied in its concept of "interested persons," the analagous standard here would require that the independent directors have neither familial, pecuniary, nor other
213 See text accompanying notes 194-200 supra.
214 See, e.g., Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1941), discussed at text
accompanying notes 56-59 supra.
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business affiliation with either the control purchaser or the control seller. Although this restriction may seem harsh, it would
not apply to the whole board and would be of limited
duration-perhaps the Investment Company Act's three year
period. Additionally, the need for such an independent board
would be obviated were the minority invited to participate in the
control transaction on a pro rata basis.
As in the investment company context,2 15 this method of
protection can be viewed as relatively hollow to the extent that it
is concerned with the form of the transaction rather than the
substance. In the investment company context, however, the
functions of the board have been largely preempted by the investment adviser, 2 16 the very entity from which protection is
needed. In the conventional corporate context, looting or the
appropriation of a corporate opportunity would ordinarily be
accomplished by the corporation's officers or directors. Although directors have little control over officers' actions on a
day-to-day basis, an independent board of directors should be
able to prevent the grosser forms of abuse present in many of
the cases.2 17 Also, the independent board is only one safeguard;
control transactions are not insulated from attack merely by complying with that requirement.
Placing checks on the actions of the control purchaser makes
it less likely that the premium will reflect anything other than
what the courts would call reasonable under traditional analysis.
In addition, this proposal could be supplemented by a requirement that the premium or a substantial portion thereof, when
not offered pro rata to the minority, be held by the control seller
in constructive trust for the minority shareholders for the same
three-year period. The seller might be required to establish some
type of escrow arrangement for the premium or the assets in
which the seller chose to invest. Although this varies substantially
from Professor Bayne's strict trust theory, it is a limited vehicle
for providing much of the protection he advocates. The minority
could seek an accounting from the constructive trust if any of
the abuses associated with control premiums occur during the
three-year period.
This proposed remedial scheme would provide the final
21"See text accompanying note 197 supra.
216

Id.

2'7 See, e.g., Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 535 F.2d 982 (7th Cir. 1976).
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protection of applying an "unfair burden" concept similar to that
now contained in the Investment Company Act.21 8 The premium would be subject to recapture when there is an inherent
unfairness in the transaction. This, in effect, adopts the ZahnAhmanson position that the controlling shareholder is under a
fiduciary duty to the corporation and the other shareholders, at
least when the shareholder is selling control.2 19 The "inherent
unfairness" standard is the key to providing the necessary flexibility in dealing with control premium situations. Courts could
then attack the substance of the transaction in the extreme cases
in which compliance with the form outlined above would not be
sufficient and in which the transaction turns sour after expiration of the three-year period.
These protections would fill the gap between the per se rule
in the case of the very closely held corporation and the expanded Williams Act type of coverage that would apply to the
public issue company. Adoption of this aspect of the proposal
could best be implemented by means of state legislation. In the
absence of such legislation, corporate practitioners could achieve
the same protections by patterning control transfers according to
these suggested guidelines.
Twenty years ago Professor Jennings lamented the "meandering" path of the law governing control-related transaction. 2
Although today's path may be longer and wider, it is no less
tortuous. This uncertainty in the law has resulted in the
emergence of a variety of approaches to the control premium
problem. State law treatment of the issue has dealt mainly with
the extent to which the controlling shareholders owe a fiduciary
duty. The most significant recent state law development is special treatment for closely held corporations. Federal securities
law also plays an important role in dealing with the control issue.
Although the possibility of relief through a private lOb-5 damage action is not great, the Williams Act's disclosure and pro rata
offering requirements may provide new remedies for the minority, either directly or by analogy. The Investment Company Act's
response to the control premium problem in the context of
218

See text accompanying notes 187-200 supra.

219See text accompanying notes 74-80 supra. Although Ahmanson probably does not

state the majority rule on the duties of controlling shareholders, it is part of the trend
towards closer scrutiny of control transactions. See text accompanying notes 39 & 204
supra.
2211Jennings, supra note 1, at 38.
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transfers of an investment advisory contract-especially the Act's
"unfair burden" standard, the requirement of an independent
board, and the imposition of liability on the purchaser of
control-should be useful in fashioning safeguards and remedies
in the conventional control premium situation.
The proposal stated above is an attempt to combine these
approaches while maintaining two important balances. First, the
minority shareholder's need for protection from oppression by
the majority must be balanced against the majority's right to the
full economic value of their holdings. Second, providing a
reasonable amount of predictability in the law on control premiums must be balanced against leaving the courts sufficient
flexibility to heed the equities of the individual case. It is time for
the courts and legislatures, whether through this proposal or
another, to provide the necessary balance to the law governing
control transactions.

